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Abstract- In most emerging markets, small and medium 
enterprises, (SMEs), lack access to thecredit and 
liquiditythey require for their dailyworkingcapital needs. 
Supply chain finance is a broad category of financing with 
multiple products,and it contributes significantly to global 
trade finance. This paper utilized several variables, such as 
changes in liquidity level (quick ratio), changes in debt bias, 
changes in the cost of goods sold, changes in earnings, and 
changes in stock returns through the supply chain finance. 
Employing binary logistic regression, the test results showed 
that accounts, such as current assets, current debt, long-
term debt, net income, cost of goods sold, gross margins, 
were connected to the agent's opportunistic behavior when 
the financial health of the company has decreased. In the 
end, it concluded that SEMs in the management of these 
accounts was proven by supply chain finance in the 
preparation of financial statements and good distribution 
when the financial health of the company has achieved.  
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Supply chain finance has now surpassed traditional 
trade finance in market revenues. We expect this trend to 
accelerate over the next three to five years, driven by 
three waves: deepening of established solutions targeted 
at suppliers, further integration and sophistication of 
products for buyers and, ultimately, convergence between 
buyer and supplier oriented solutions. Our latest article 
looks at these three waves - and the opportunities each 
one holds for banks. Basically, the preparation of 
financial statements is the SEMs company's management. 
In [1] have proven that accounts receivable, inventory, 
and sales accounts are subjectively regulated by 
management in many companies in Greece. Globally, 
Statement of Auditing Standard (SAS) No. 99 of 2002 
has also included the term "nature of the industry" as a 
condition of management SEMs in determining nominal 
estimates contained in financial statements. It reflects the 
preparation of risky financial statements with 
manipulation by agents. In [2] has proven that SEMs in 
making financial statements termed "cooking the books" 
can lead to manipulative behavior. 
The paradigm that underlies agency theory is the 
conflict of interest between agent and principal that 
stimulates the opportunistic behavior of agents or often 
called "supply chain finance" [3]. Some studies represent 
supply chain finance as an agent's reluctance to try more 
for the principal's benefit and tend to be opportunistic for 
his own interests  [4-10]. As [11] found evidence that if 
there was an incentive conflict between the principal and 
the agent, the supply chain finance by the agent was to 
attempt to underreport. It means that the SEMs of agents 
in preparing financial statements tends to trigger supply 
chain finance by agents that manifest a loss for the 
principal. 
Supply chain finance is the impact of a conflict of 
interest between an agent and a principal [12]. 
Differences in interests between agents and principals 
have been proven to trigger manipulative behavior in the 
form of delays in recording ownership of shares and 
dividend payments, as well as high agency costs [13]. 
Meanwhile, high funding towards agents is also caused 
by high principal demands on their profits [14]. Both 
studies indicate that supply chain finance is a 
consequence of conflicts of interest between principals 
and agents. 
This paper aimed to prove whether the SEMs of 
agents in the preparation of financial statements could 
stimulate supply chain finance. More specifically, SEMs 
by agents is represented in the management of company 
liquidity [7], long-term debt management [15], cost of 
goods sold management [16], earnings management [5; 
17], and management of executive share ownership [13; 
18]. Meanwhile, the author set supply chain finance as 
the dependent variable, which was proxied by indicators 
of financial statement manipulation (M - Score) [19-22]. 
The M-Score calculation model has been trusted by many 
researchers as a detector of financial statement 
manipulation. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
2.1. Finance supply chain  
Buyers and suppliers in a supply chain have 
competing financial interests. The buyer wants to pay as 
late as possible and the supplier wants to be paid as early 
as possible. Supply chain finance has emerged to bridge 
these conflicting interests, providing a range of financing 
and risk mitigation solutions designed to optimise 
working capital and liquidity in domestic and 
international supply chains. Some products are provided 
directly to the suppliers, others via buyers. Measurement 
of financial statement manipulation is obtained from the 
calculation of the M-Score model, as in the study [23-
28]. This model combines eight ratios, such as Days 
Sales in Receivables Index (DSRI), Gross Margin Index 
(GMI), Asset Quality Index (AQI), Sales Growth Index 
(SGI), Depreciation Index (DEPI), Sales and General 
Administration Expenses Index (DEPI) SGAI), Leverage 
Index (LVGI), and Total Accrual to Total Assets 
(TATA). Financial statements are indicated to be 
manipulative if M-Score> -2.22, while M-Score <-2.22 
indicates the financial statements are assumed to be free 
from manipulation. Formula 1 was the M-Score 
calculation used in this paper. ______________________________________________________________ 
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Formula 1. M- Score Calculation 
 
M-Score = -4,84 + 0,920 DSRI + 0,528 GMI + 0,404 AQI 
+ 0,892 SGI + 0,115DEPI - 0,172 SGAI - 
0,327 LVGI + 4,697 TATA 
Notes: 
DSRI = (Net Receivable/ Sales t) ÷ (Net 
Receivable t-1/ Sales t-1) 
GMI = (Sales t-1 - COGs t-1)/ Sales t-1) ÷ (Sales t - 
COGs t)/Sales t) 
AQI = (TA t - (CA t + PPE t)/ TAt) ÷ (TA t - 1 - (CA 
t-1 + PPE t-1)/ TA t-1 
SGI = Sales t ÷ Sales t-1 
DEPI = ｛Deprec t-1 / (PPE t-1 + Deprec t-1) 
÷ (Deprec t / (PPE t + Deprec t) 
SGAI  = (SG&A expense t / Sales t) ÷ (SG&A 
expense t -1 / Sales t-1) 
LVGI = (CL t + LTD t) / TA t ｝ ÷ (CL t-1 + 
LTD t-1) / TA t-1｝ 
TATA = (Net Income from continuing 
operation － Cash Flow operation) ÷ Total assets  
 
2.2. Opportunistic Behavior in the Management 
of Corporate Liquidity  
The inability of agents to communicate financial 
tensions raises the risk of violations of the law in solving 
problems [29]. Financial tension is very risky to decrease 
the financial performance of the agents because it is 
connected to the company's liquidity [30]. Further, it is 
explained that poor liquidity results in a decrease in the 
profits of the stakeholders. From a systemic risk 
perspective, liquidity management is an essential factor 
in maintaining the company's financial stability [28]. 
Meanwhile, [31] stated that manipulating the recording of 
company assets is a habit carried out by agents so that the 
company's liquidity seems stable. 
From an accounting perspective, the most effective 
calculation for assessing company liquidity is with a 
quick ratio (QR) [32]. This ratio illustrates the ability of 
lancer-highly liquid assets (CA) to bear its current debt 
(CL). Good liquidity is represented by changes in CA 
values, which are directly proportional to changes in CL 
values. The author identifies the opportunistic behavior 
of agents in managing liquidity by calculating changes in 
the quick ratio (ΔQR). Formula 2 shows the calculation 
of ΔQR by dividing between changes in current assets 
(CA) per year and changes in current liabilities (CL) per 
year. The logic developed is that the irregularities in the 
management of company liquidity by agents can occur 
when changes in CA values are inversely proportional to 
changes in CL values. Thus, if ΔQR negatively 
influences the manipulation of financial statements (MS), 
then it indicates that supply chain finance has occurred 
by the agent in preparing the financial statements. 
Referring to that explanation, the author formulated the 
hypothesis (H1): "Changes in the quick ratio (ΔQR) have 
a significant negative effect on supply chain finance in 
the preparation of corporate financial statements." 
 
 
Formula 2. Calculation of Quick Ratio 
Change (ΔQR) 
 
ΔQR =  (CA t － CA t-1)/(CL t － CL t -1) 
Note: t (current year), t-1 (previous year) 
 
2.3. Opportunistic Behavior in Long-Term Debt 
Management  
In most countries, the income tax system allows a 
reduction in taxes based on loan interest [33] Meanwhile, 
longer debt maturities and higher leverage occur in 
countries with high tax protection [34]. One impact is 
that many companies are implementing "debt bias" by 
regulating profits as much as possible to take on more 
long-term debt [35]. It means an increase in long-term 
debt can be categorized as a debt bias if it is only used to 
reduce income tax. 
Debt bias (DB) is interpreted as an effort to increase 
long-term debt (LTD) to reduce income tax, which 
manifests in increasing net income (NI). It means that the 
change in LTD value is directly proportional to the 
change in NI value. The agent's opportunistic behavior in 
managing long-term debt based on changes in debt bias 
(ΔDB) was identified by the author. Formula 3 shows the 
calculation of ΔDB by dividing between changes in LTD 
per year and NI per year. If the value of ΔDB has a 
positive effect on the manipulation of financial 
statements (MS), then it indicates that supply chain 
finance has occurred by the agent. Thus, the author 
formulated the hypothesis (H2): "Changes in debt bias 
(ΔDB) have a significant positive effect on supply chain 
finance in the preparation of corporate financial 
statements." Formula 3. Calculation of Change in Debt 
Bias  
ΔDB = (LTD t － LTD t-1)/(NI t －NI t-1) 
Note: t (current year), t-1 (previous year) 
 
2.4. Opportunistic Behavior in the Management 
of Cost of Goods Sold 
Previous research has proven that SEMs ctivity is 
connected to the manipulation of sales and inventory 
accounts, which manifests in increasing gross margin [4; 
36]. More specific, [37] explained that the agent's 
opportunistic behavior is interpreted by shifting the Cost 
of Goods Sold (COGS) into operational costs, such as 
costs of research and development (R&D) or sales costs, 
general and administration (SG&A) to increase the gross 
margin (GM) value. Referring to that explanation, the 
author would identify the supply chain finance in the 
management of the Cost of Goods Sold by calculating the 
change (OGCOGS) per year. Formula 4 shows the 
calculation of OGCOGS by dividing between changes in 
the value of R&D or SG&A per year and changes in GM 
values per year. If OGCOGS has a positive effect on the 
manipulation of financial statements (MS), then it 
indicates that there has been a supply chain finance by 
the agent. Thus, the authors formulated the hypothesis 
(H3): "Changes in Cost of Goods Sold (OGCOGS) have 
a significant positive effect on supply chain finance in the 
preparation of corporate financial statements." Formula 4. 
Calculation of Change in Cost of Goods Sold (ΔCOGS) 
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ΔCOGS= (R&D t  ＋ SG&A t)－(R&D t -1 ＋ SG&A t-
1)/(GM t － GM t-1) 
Note: t (current year), t-1 (previous year) 
 
2.5. Opportunistic behavior in earnings 
management 
In determining earnings targets, the principal refers to 
the comparison between cost and benefit [21]. It means 
that earnings targets are consequences received by 
agents, while rewards are consequences for principals. 
Setting higher profit targets actually result in agents 
manipulating earnings earned by the principal [8]. 
Furthermore, the study showed an increase in earnings 
had a significant effect on increasing profitability and 
assets. Referring to the research, the author identifies 
opportunistic behavior by agents by calculating earnings 
changes (ΔET) periodically. Formula 5 shows the ΔET 
calculation by dividing the change in net income (NI) 
from the change in total assets (TA). If the change has a 
significant positive effect on the manipulation of 
financial statements (MS), then it indicates that supply 
chain finance has occurred by the agent. Thus, the author 
formulated hypothesis (H4): "Changes in earnings (ΔET) 
affect significantly positive on supply chain finance in 
the preparation of corporate financial statements". 
Formula 5. Calculation of Earning Change (ΔET) 
ΔET =(NI t －NI t-1)/(TA t －TA t-1)  
Note: t (current year), t-1 (previous year) 
 
2.6. Opportunistic Behavior in Executive Share 
Ownership  
 When agents have the interests of shares in a 
company, their interests can affect the company's 
financial performance [37]. Although ownership of an 
agent's share will reduce agency costs, it will actually 
encourage the behavior of maximizing wealth among 
agents [38]. In [39] also explained that the manipulation 
that occurs in the financial statements is influenced by 
the ownership of the agent's shares. Under the excuse of 
increasing company value, agents can maximize wealth 
by increasing their stock dividends. It is because dividend 
payments are positively related to firm value [19]. 
On the other hand, agents can also delay dividend 
payments by delaying share ownership. Referring to that 
explanation, the author would identify the agent's 
opportunistic behavior in managing share ownership by 
calculating the change in share profit (ΔPS) per year. 
Formula 6 shows the calculation of ΔPS by dividing 
between changes in the value of dividends paid (DEV) 
per year and changes in management share ownership 
(MO) per year. If ΔPS has a significant positive effect on 
the manipulation of financial statements (MS), then it 
indicates that supply chain finance has occurred by the 
agent. Thus, the author formulated a hypothesis (H5): 
"Changes in share profits (ΔPS) have a significant 
positive effect on supply chain finance in the preparation 
of corporate financial statements." Formula 6. 
Calculation of Changes in Stock Profits (ΔPS) 
ΔPS =(DEV t － DEV t-1)/(MO t － MO t-1) 
Note: t (current year), t-1 (previous year) 
 
3. Method  
The author used secondary data, namely the financial 
statements of manufacturing companies released by the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) - www.idx.co.id. 
Meanwhile, the population was all manufacturing 
companies listed on the IDX for the period 2015 - 2017. 
Sampling employed a purposive sampling method, which 
is sampling with specific criteria [14]. The sample 
criteria considered by the author included companies 
listed on the IDX successively during the observation 
year, companies provided financial information using the 
rupiah currency, and companies had the required data and 
information. Based on these criteria, there were 66 
companies selected as samples, with three years of 
observation (2015-2017). Thus, the observations were 








Figure 1. Conceptual Framework 
 
The dependent variable was the manipulation of 
financial statements (MS), which was calculated by the 
M-Score model. The independent variables used were 
changes in the quick ratio (ΔQR), changes in debt bias 
(ΔDB), changes in Cost of Goods Sold (OGCOGS), 
changes in earnings (ΔET), and changes in stock returns 
(ΔPS). An overview of the operational definitions of 
variables is explained in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Definition of Variable Operations 





Dependent MS It used indicators of manipulation of 
financial statements, which were 
calculated employing the M-Score model. 
They were dummy variables, M-Score > -
2.22, manipulative, notation (0), M-Score 
<-2.22, no manipulative notation (1) 
(Formula 1). 




Independent ΔQR It divided the change in current assets 
(CA) per year against changes in current 
debt (CL) per year (Formula 2). 
3 Change in 
debt bias 
Independent ΔDB It divided the change in long-term debt 
(LTP) per year against changes in net 
income (NI) per year (Formula 3). 
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4 Change in 
cost of 
goods sold 
Independent ΔCOGS It divided the changes in R&D and SG&A 
costs per year against changes in the value 
of gross margin per year (Formula 4). 
5 Changes in 
earnings 
Independent ΔET It divided the change in net income (NI) 
from the change in total assets (TA) 
(Formula 5). 
6 Changes in 
stock returns 
Independent ΔPS It divided the changes in dividends (DVD) 
per year to changes in management share 
ownership (MO) per year (Formula 6). 
 
Hypothesis testing utilized a binary logistic regression 
model, which positioned the MS variable as a dummy 
variable. Hosmer and Lemeshow's of fit-test were used to 
assess the overall model, whether the whole model was 
feasible, which referred to the Likelihood-L value. 
Pseudo R square was employed to evaluate whether the 
independent variables in this study could explain the 
dependent variable. The analysis process was carried out 
by testing the overall data for three years (2015-2017) 
and annually. Formula 7 was a regression equation for 
testing hypotheses. 
MS i     = α - β1 ΔQR i + β2 ΔDB i + β4 ΔCOGS i + β5 ΔET i + 
β5 ΔPS i + µ……………..1  
MS i(t) = α - β1 ΔQR i(t) + β2 ΔDB i(t) + β4 ΔCOGS i(t) + β5 
ΔET i(t) + β5 ΔPS i(t) + µ .....2 
Note:  
MS :  M-Score - Indicators of manipulation of 
financial statements (dummy variable, M-Score > -2.22, 
manipulative, notation (0), M-Score <-2.22, no 
manipulative notation (1). 
ΔQR ` :  Quick ratio change. 
ΔDB : Change in debt bias. 
ΔCOGS :  Changes to Cost of Goods Sold. 
ΔET : Changes in earnings. 
ΔPS : Changes in stock returns. 
α : Constant. 
β : Coefficient.  
i  : Company of- i. 
t  : Year of- t. 
4. Analysis Results   
 Table 2 presents the results of hypothesis testing with 
logistic regression models in this study. Unfortunately, 
the results of the Hosmer and Lemeshow test in all 
samples showed a significance value of chi-square of 
0.035, below the significance of 5%, so the model used 
was unable to predict the value of the observations. The 
annual test indicated that the ΔQR variable was 
consistently negative and statistically significant. 
Meanwhile, the ΔDB and OGCOGS variables 
statistically revealed significance values that were not 
consistent, so they could not be used as reference results. 
The other variables statistically exposed insignificant 
results in all tests. The results of this test indicated that 
the hypothesis (H1) was accepted. Still, the author 
believed that these results were not robust due to 
problems in the prediction value of chi-square in testing 
the entire sample. In the next step, the authors conducted 
an "additional analysis" using the indicator of corporate 
financial health (ZS) as a moderating variable. The 
author wanted to ascertain whether adding the ZS 
variable could improve the model used, specifically in 
the acquisition of predictive value (Sig. Chi-square) in 
the observations. The author suspected that the poor 
financial health of the company (ZS) was a trigger for the 
opportunistic behavior of agents, which manifested in the 
manipulation of financial statements. 
 
Table 2. Variable in Equation 
 Predicted Sign All 2015 2016 2017 
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-2Log likelihood  158.224 52.031 33.488 51.325 
R-square (R2)  0.590 0.598 0.779 0.606 
Sig. Chi-Square  0.035 0.836 0.813 0.970 
N  198 66 66 66 
Dependent Variable: MS 
Note: This table presents the correlation coefficient number (β), while the number between parentheses is 
the standard error. The *, **, and *** signs indicate significance at the levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
 
The author identified the company's financial health 
condition by using the Altman Z-Score model [3]. This 
model has been universally accepted for assessing 
company survival and bankruptcy [2; 23]. This model 
was calculated by combining several ratios, including 
working capital to total assets (WC), retained earnings to 
total assets (RE), earnings before interest and tax to total 
assets (IT), market value equity to book value of total 
debt (MV), and sales to total assets (SA) [3; ]. (A; 
Ravisankar et al., 2011). Furthermore, Altman (1968) 
determined the Z-Score range of 1.81 - 2.99 as a 
threshold for the financial health of a company that can 
still be tolerated. Meanwhile, a score > 2.99 indicates that 
the company is in a healthy financial condition, and a 
score of <1.81 shows poor financial health. Formula 8 
displayed the Z-score calculation. Formula 8. Altman Z-
Score calculation 
ZS = 0.012WC + 0.014 RE+ 0.033 IT + 0.006 MV + 
0.999 SA 
Notes:   
WC  = Working capital ÷ Total assets 
RE  = Retained earnings ÷ Total assets  
IT = Earnings before interest and tax ÷ Total assets  
MV = Market value equity ÷ book value of total debt 
SA = Sales ÷ Total assets 
 
The financial health variable (ZS) employed in this 
paper was measured from the change (increase or 
decrease) in the Z-Score per year. This variable 
functioned as a dummy variable. If there was a decrease, 
it was given a notation (0), while if there was an increase 
in score, it was given a notation (1). It was hoped that this 
variable could improve the predicted value (chi-square). 
The author suspected that the poor financial health of the 
company (ZS) was a trigger for the opportunistic 
behavior of agents, which manifested in the manipulation 
of financial statements. It indicated that the ZS variable 
had a significant negative effect on supply chain finance 
in the preparation of financial statements. The logistic 
regression equation using the ZS moderation variable is 
contained in Formula 9, while the test model is in Figure 
2. Formula 9. Logistic Regression Equation with 
moderation variables (ZS) 
MS i     = α - β1 ΔQR i + β2 ΔDB i + β4 ΔCOGS i + β5 ΔET i 
+ β5 ΔPS i – β6 ZS + µ…….1  
MS i(t) = α - β1 ΔQR i(t) + β2 ΔDB i(t) + β4 ΔCOGS i(t) + β5 
ΔET i(t) + β5 ΔPS i(t) – β6 ZS + µ ……..2 
Note:  
ZS : Z-Score – indicator of corporate financial 
health (Dummy variable, 0: Decrease, 1: increase (1). 
 
 
Figure 2. The testing model with moderation variables 
(ZS) 
             
4.1. Additional Analysis Results 
Table 3 shows the Significance Value of chi-square 
for all tests above 5% significance so that the model used 
could predict all observations. The coefficient of 
determination (R2) in testing the entire sample was 
0.820, which means the influence between variables was 
getting stronger. Meanwhile, the coefficient value (β) of 
the variable RQR was -4.660 and statistically significant. 
It means that changes in the quick ratio had a significant 
negative effect on the manipulation of financial 
statements (MS). Variables ΔDB and ΔCOGS, each had 
coefficient values (β) of 15,402 and 5,241, which were 
statistically significant. The corporate financial health 
variable (ZS) obtained a coefficient value (β) of -4,223 
and statistically significant. It indicates that this variable 
strengthened the influence of the ΔQR, ΔDB, and 
ΔCOGS variables on the MS variable. On the other hand, 
the ΔET and ΔPS variables were not statistically 
significant, which means that the two variables could not 
explain the variable manipulation of financial statements 
(MS). 
Overall test results in Table 3 presented consistent 
results on each independent variable. Variables of ΔQR, 
ΔDB, and ΔCOGS consistently revealed coefficient 
values (β) in accordance with the prediction set. Also, the 
ZS variable had managed to moderate the three variables, 
so that it had a more substantial effect. In other words, 
SEMs in the recording of current asset accounts, current 
debt, long-term debt, net income, cost of goods sold, and 
gross margins caused a hazard by agents when the 
financial health of the company decreased. The detailed 
test results are illustrated in Table 3, while the 
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Table 3. Variables in Equation Include Moderating Variable (ZS) 
 Predicted Sign All 2015 2016 2017 

















































-2Log likelihood  85.176 25.162 18.492 22.473 
R-square (R2)  0.820 0.845 0.892 0.864 
Sig. Chi-Square  0.560 0.880 0.899 0.973 
N  198 66 66 66 
Dependent Variable: MS 
Note: This table displays the correlation coefficient number (β), while the number between parentheses is 
the standard error. The *, **, and *** signs indicate significance at the levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
 
5. Discussion  
Every company tries to meet the demand of the 
product with proper supply in a timely manner by using 
effective resources. Some of the important goals of 
supply chain management are: 
• People work together at different levels of the 
supply chain to maximize resource efficiency, build 
standardized processes, eliminate duplicate effort, and 
minimize inventory levels. 
• Minimizing supply chain costs is essential, 
especially when there is economic uncertainty in capital 
retention. 
• Efficient and inexpensive costs are essential, but 
supply chain managers need to focus on creating value 
for their customers. 
• The best way to meet customers' expectations is 
on a regular basis. 
• Increases customer expectations by creating a 
variety of products, customizing goods, off-season 
inventory and fast delivery. 
• To meet consumer expectations, merchants must 
use inventory as a common resource and use order 
management technology to supply it from the relevant 
unit in the supply chain. 
Finally, supply chain management aims to contribute 
to a company's financial success. In addition to all of the 
above, the goal is to guide supply chain companies to 
improve differentiation, increase sales, and penetrate new 
markets, as well as manage competitive profits and 
shareholder value. In general, the opportunistic behavior 
of management in preparing financial statements is 
always associated with the problem of manipulation of 
financial statements or often called "fraud" [15; 25; 26; 
30]. Meanwhile, various studies have proven that the M-
Score calculation model can detect manipulations in the 
company's financial statements [2; 4; 5; 6; 16]. Using this 
model, the author innovates several accounts in financial 
statements that are connected with conflicts of interest 
between agents and principals. Some of the accounts are 
current assets, current debt, long-term debt, net income, 
cost of goods sold, and gross margin. The results of the 
analysis in this study indicated that the SEMs in the 
management of these accounts would stimulate supply 
chain finance when the condition of the company's 
financial health decreased. 
Financial health condition is a special variable in this 
study. The results of this study indicated that the 
manipulation of financial statements was a strategy by 
agents to increase the value of the company when a 
decline in the company's financial health occurred. 
Variable financial health condition is a trigger factor for 
multidimensional fraud. If financial conditions improve, 
then it becomes opportunities for agents to manipulate 
financial statements to increase incentives  [35; 37]. If 
financial conditions persist or worsen, then it manifests 
into pressure on agents that trigger the manipulation of 
financial statements so that the company's financial 
condition appears stable [36]. Besides, the agent can also 
rationalize his actions to be a truth because he considers 
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the manipulation of financial statements as a help for the 
company [30]. Thus, the author believed that the decline 
in corporate health was behind the manipulative behavior 
of agents in preparing financial statements. 
Detection of manipulative behavior is difficult to 
express because various motivations can encourage 
someone to commit fraud and the many ways used to 
commit fraud [9]. Other research also revealed that 
efforts to provide remuneration packages for agents and 
board independence proved ineffective in regulating 
agents in many companies in the country of Iran [39]. 
Both studies indicate that fraudulent behavior is more 
beneficial for agents so that the remuneration package 
and the independence of the board cannot be used as an 
effective way to regulate agents. Specifically, this paper 
provided a clear picture of effective strategies for 
detecting manipulative behavior by agents. The 
manipulative agent indicator used several accounts in the 
financial statements, such as current assets, current debt, 
long-term debt, net profit, cost of goods sold, and gross 
margin, which were connected to the financial health 
condition of the company. 
 
Table 4. Interpretation of Testing Results 




Changes in earnings are were a benchmark to detect supply chain finance 
in the preparation of financial statements. Thus, earnings targets, which 
were suspected of providing pressures for agents, were apparently not 
proven to trigger supply chain finance by agents in preparing financial 




Agent share ownership was not a benchmark for detecting supply chain 
finance in the preparation of financial statements. It indicated that efforts 
to maximize wealth by agents and manipulation of share ownership had 




Management of company liquidity by agents was proven to trigger supply 
chain finance in the preparation of financial statements. These results 
indicated that the SEMs had manifested as an effort to manipulate current 




Long-term debt management by agents was proven to trigger supply 
chain finance in the preparation of financial statements. It indicated that 





Management of Cost of goods sold by agents had proven to trigger supply 
chain finance in the preparation of financial statements. These results 
indicated that the SEMs of an agent had manifested itself as an effort to 
manipulate research and development costs or sales, general, and 
administrative costs to increase the value of gross margins. 
ZS Moderation These results indicated that the condition of the company's financial 
health was a determinant of the occurrence of supply chain finance agents 
in the preparation of financial statements. Thus, SEMs opportunistic 
behavior in managing current assets, current debt, long-term debt, and 
Cost of goods sold was caused by a decline in the company's financial 
health. 
 
6. Conclusion and Implication 
6.1. Conclusion 
This paper obtained the results that the SEMs in the 
preparation of financial statements was a trigger for the 
occurrence of supply chain finance. Other findings 
indicated that the unstable financial health condition was 
one of the factors underlying opportunistic behavior by 
agents. Conflicts of interest between agents and 
principals tended to trigger agents' opportunistic behavior 
in managing current assets, current debt, long-term debt, 
net income, cost of goods sold, and gross margin. Thus, 
the author concluded that when the company's financial 
condition decreased, the SEMs in the management of 
accounts, such as current assets, current debt, long-term 
debt, net income, cost of goods sold, and gross margin, 
was proven to trigger a supply chain finance. 
 
6.2. Implication 
This paper provided an overview of supply chain 
finances in the preparation of in-depth company financial 
statements by utilizing the accounts available therein. 
The results of the presentation have explained 
systematically about how opportunistic behavior in 
accounting records by agents. For an auditor, this paper 
can provide additional information related to the audit 
process. In general, this paper is the development of 
agency theory connected with the discipline of 
accounting, which is the novelty of this paper. The author 
recommends that academics conduct research on the 
manipulation of financial statements that are focused on 
investment accounts and intangible assets. 
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